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Abstract
Robustness against image perturbations bounded by a `p ball have been well-studied
in recent literature. Perturbations in the real-world, however, rarely exhibit the
pixel independence that `p threat models assume. A recently proposed Wasserstein
distance-bounded threat model is a promising alternative that limits the perturbation
to pixel mass movements. We point out and rectify flaws in previous definition of
the Wasserstein threat model and explore stronger attacks and defenses under our
better-defined framework. Lastly, we discuss the inability of current Wasserstein-
robust models in defending against perturbations seen in the real world. Our
code and trained models are available at https://github.com/edwardjhu/
improved_wasserstein.
1 Introduction
Deep learning approaches to computer vision tasks, such as image classification, are not robust.
For example, a data point that is classified correctly can be modified in a nearly imperceptible way
to cause the classifier to mis-classify it (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015). Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) is a well-studied method to find such small perturbations within a `p ball of
a small radius (Madry et al., 2017). While both general and effective, the `p threat model perturbs
each pixel independently, a property not seen in realistic perturbations, such as distortion, blurring,
and spatial shifts.
Previously, Wasserstein distance has been proposed as a more perceptually-aligned metric for im-
ages (Peleg et al., 1989). Recently, Wong et al. (2019) proposed a Wasserstein distance-based threat
model as an alternative to the `p threat model, and derived a computationally feasible approach
to project onto the Wasserstein ball during PGD. Fig. 1 (Left) shows a perturbation found when
attacking a `p robust model with our Wasserstein threat model. The perturbation looks different than
that from a `p threat model.
The Wasserstein threat model of Wong et al. (2019) provided a great foundation, but only considered
normalized images; their attack algorithm, when applied to real images, could produce a perturbed
image that is outside the allowed Wasserstein ball. In this work, we define the Wasserstein threat model
such that it applies to all images, and we provide a safe algorithm to find adversarial perturbations
within a specified Wasserstein radius. Our algorithm uses a constrained Sinkhorn iteration to project
images onto the intersection of a Wasserstein ball and a `∞ ball; the computational overhead from our
new constraint is offset by our run-time optimizations and justified by our stronger attacks. Further,
we provide a significantly stronger attack than Wong et al. (2019)’s by exploring different PGD steps,
which we incorporate in an adversarial training framework to obtain more robust models.
The main contributions of our work include:
• A definition of the Wasserstein adversarial threat model for all images of the same dimen-
sionality, fixing a glitch in the previous formulation (Sec. 3);
∗Work done as a part of the Microsoft AI Residency Program.
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MNIST 1-Wasserstein × npixel 5 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000
Wong et al. (2019) (%) 100 100 100 100 94 91 83 71
Our Attack (%) 100 90 85 68 39 8 1 1
CIFAR-10 1-Wasserstein × npixel 5 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000
Wong et al. (2019) (%) 82 82 82 82 82 81 80 77
Our Attack (%) 76 68 58 35 20 9 1 0
Table 1: Empirical top-1 accuracies of the adversarially trained Wasserstein-robust classifier
from Wong et al. (2019) under their and our attack at various Wasserstein radii () multiplied
by the per image pixel count npixel. Results are for MNIST and CIFAR-10. Lower accuracy at a
given  suggests a stronger attack.
• A constrained Sinkhorn iteration projection algorithm that produces adversarial examples
under our new, better-formulated threat model (Sec. 4);
• A significantly stronger Wasserstein-bounded attack by taking a different PGD step; our
new attack breaks adversarially trained Wasserstein-robust models in prior works (Sec. 5);
• An adversarially trained model that achieves state-of-the-art robustness against the new
attacks, while still being robust against the attacks in prior works (Sec. 6).
2 Adversarial Robustness for Images
Deep neural networks (DNNs) can be fooled into making wrong predictions by deliberately changing
the input in ways imperceptible to humans. In this section we summarize common approaches for
such attacks and defenses against them.
Adversarial Attacks One well-studied example is the additive `p-bounded attack (Madry et al.,
2017; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Wong & Kolter, 2018), where a perturbation
designed to increase the loss of the correct label, usually found using first-order information, is
added to the input. PGD performs this addition and projection jointly and iteratively (Madry et al.,
2017), which gives an efficient empirical algorithm for finding adversarial examples. The `p norm of
total perturbation is bounded to a small  so that the change is imperceptible. Another example is
the pixel-wise functional attack (Laidlaw & Feizi, 2019), where a function is applied to each pixel
individually, with constraints on the function itself and/or on the output pixel, enabling attacks in the
color space, for instance. Image-wide attacks can also be used to fool DNNs. These are defined by a
function that applies to the image as a whole, such as translations and rotations, with `p constraints
on the function parameters (Mohapatra et al., 2019). In this work, we focus on a different class of
attacks, specifically adversarial examples with a bounded Wasserstein distance (Wong et al., 2019)
and whose `1 norm is the same as the original inputs.
Adversarial Defenses In order to defend a model against a given adversary, one can emply em-
pirical or certified defenses. Empirical defenses are basically heuristics that are used to train robust
models. One of the most effective empirical defenses is adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Madry et al., 2017; Wong et al., 2019), in which a given predictive model is trained on adversarial
examples generated by a given threat model. This defense, although empirical, has proven to be
one of the strongest defenses in practice. Certified defenses on the other hand are those that provide
guarantees under a specific threat model (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al.,
2019a; Levine & Feizi, 2019; Salman et al., 2019b; Weng et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018),
but these often yield weaker empirical performance. In this work, we focus on empirical defenses,
specifically adversarial training.
3 Wasserstein Distance-based Threat Model
The p-Wasserstein distance between two probability distributions measures the “minimal effort”
needed to rearrange the probability mass in one distribution so it matches the other one. More
formally, given two distributions A and B over a metric space X with metric d, the p-Wasserstein
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Figure 1: Left: A Wasserstein perturbation found by our attack that causes the `2 robust model
from Engstrom et al. (2019) to misclassify a image from ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015).
Middle: Clamping the perturbed image (x′, x′′) can increase the Wasserstein distance to the original
image (x), especially it is if near the boundary; the blue circle represents a Wasserstein ball of radius
; the orange parallelogram represents an `∞ ball; c(·) is the clamping function. Right: We break
the adversarially trained Wasserstein-robust model from Wong et al. (2019) by dimming the image
brightness, which does not change the normalized image. The example here has its brightness reduced
by 3x.
distance is defined as Wp(A,B) =
[
infΓ E(x,y)∼Γd(x, y)p
] 1
p where Γ is a distribution over the
product space X × X such that its marginals are A and B. Given two images represented as 3-
dimensional tensors, x, x′ ∈ Rm,n,c+ where m,n are the dimensions of the image and c is the number
of channels; we measure the p-Wasserstein distance between them by normalizing both tensors into
probability distributions. Intuitively, the p-Wasserstein distance measures the cost of transporting
pixel mass to turn one image into the other2, with the transport costing pixel distance (measured in d)
to the pth power per unit mass. We define the p-Wasserstein distance of images x and x′ of the same
dimensionality with non-zero `1-norms as:
Wp(x, x
′) =
∑
i∈{R,G,B}
Wp
(
xi
||xi||1 ,
x′i
||x′i||1
)
(1)
Note that x and x′ can have different `1 norms. According to Wong et al. (2019), an adversarial
example x′ of radius  under the p-Wasserstein threat model is one that causes the neural network to
give a different prediction than that of x and also satisfies: Wp(x, x′) ≤ .
An Obvious Flaw This threat model only considers the probability distribution represented by the
image but not the total pixel mass (i.e. the `1-norm of the image, reflected as brightness). We devise
a trivial attack to break the Wasserstein-robust model from Wong et al. (2019) by simply dimming
the brightness of images from the MNIST test set. By dividing the image tensor by 30 (x 7→ x/30),
we cause the model to misclassify 86% of the test set, even though all the dimmed data points have a
Wasserstein distance of 0 to the original undimmed data points, as illustrated in Fig. 1 (Right).
Intuitively, a threat model that allows pixel mass movements should preserve the total pixel mass.
Therefore, we further require our Wasserstein threat model to preserve the `1 norm, or the total pixel
mass, after the perturbation. This is a commonly acknowledged constraint to make the Wasserstein
distance a true metric (Rubner et al., 2000) and was implicit in the attack-finding PGD algorithm
of Wong et al. (2019), where the original image’s `1 norm is used to re-scale the their Sinkhorn
projected probability distributions.
Definition 3.1. For a radius  and an image x, we define our constrained Wasserstein ball to be
B(x, ) = {x′ : Wp(x, x′) ≤ , ‖x‖1 = ‖x′‖1,
pixel range [0, 1]︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 ≤ x′ ≤ 1 } (2)
An adversarial example of f in an  neighborhood of x is any x′ ∈ B(x, ) such that f(x′) 6= f(x).
2We only allow pixel mass movement within channels to limit our problem to finding the 2D Wasserstein
distance, following Wong et al. (2019).
3
4 Constrained Sinkhorn Iteration
PGD Iteration During untargeted3 PGD attacks, one updates the input iteratively following:
x(t+1) = proj
B(x,)
(x(t) + step
α
(∇`(f(x(t)), y))) (3)
where projB(x,) = arg minx′∈B(x,) ‖x− x′‖22 where B(x, ) is determined by the threat model.
step is a function that takes in the gradient of the model f with respect to x(t) and a step size α, and
outputs a step which is added to x(t).
For example, `∞ PGD has
step
α
= sign(∇`(f(x(t)), y)), B(x, ) = {x′ : ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ , 0 ≤ x′ ≤ 1} (4)
and `2 PGD has
step
α
=
∇`(f(x(t)), y)
‖∇`(f(x(t)), y)‖2 , B(x, ) = {x
′ : ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ , 0 ≤ x′ ≤ 1} (5)
In this section, we detail our changes to the function projB(x,) where B(x, ) describes our threat
model as in Eq. 2. We investigate the effect of the step function in Sec. 5.
To summarize our change to the projB(x,) function, we
1. add a `∞ constraint to eliminate the need for clamping;
2. improve run-time by re-using the dual variables across PGD steps;
3. modify termination conditions to allow an explicit trade-off between safety and efficiency.
Critically, this algorithm allows us to safely explore stronger empirical attacks that find perturbations
close to the allowed Wasserstein ball boundary around the original image.
The Original Algorithm in Wong et al. (2019) In the sequel, assume that all images are repre-
sented as vectors in Rn+ and bounded in [0, 1]. Projecting a perturbed image onto a Wasserstein ball
around the original image requires solving the following optimal transport problem:
minimize
z∈Rn+,Π∈Rn×n+
1
2
‖w − z‖22 s.t. Π1 = x, ΠT 1 = z, 〈Π, C〉 ≤  (6)
w is the image after taking a gradient step; x is the original image; Π is the transport plan; C is
the cost matrix; and z is the projected image. Wong et al. (2019) made this projection efficient by
approximating with an entropy-regularized optimization problem, which is solved using Lagrange
multipliers and coordinate-descent on the dual variables.
Clamping: the flaw of the algorithm in Wong et al. (2019) As shown in Eq. 2, Eq. 4, and Eq. 5,
we need to project the perturbed image into the valid pixel range. `p-based PGD attacks achieve this
by clamping every pixel to [0, 1] after projecting onto the `p ball. This ad-hoc clamping is also used
in many works studying PGD attacks using the Wasserstein threat model (Wong et al., 2019; Levine
& Feizi, 2019). However, clamping does not guarantee that the clamped image is still within the
allowed Wasserstein radius, as illustrated in Fig. 1 (Middle). Under the attack of Wong et al. (2019),
the perturbed image often uses less than 50% of the Wasserstein budget, and thus rarely goes outside
of the Wasserstein ball despite this unsafe clamping. However, as we derive stronger attacks that
project points onto the boundary of the Wasserstein ball, ad-hoc clamping causes the resultant images
to be over-budget by 50% on average, and in some cases by over 200% when using the original
Sinhorn iteration projection. This shows that the need to clamp an un-normalized image introduces a
critical flaw in Wong et al. (2019)’s attack-finding algorithm. We bypass this need for clamping by
deriving a constrained Sinkhorn iteration to project directly onto the intersecton of the Wasserstein
ball and an `∞ ball, making this ad-hoc clamping unnecessary.
3We maximize the loss of the correct label during an untargeted attack, and minimize the loss of a particular
incorrect label during a targeted attack.
4
Our Algorithm As discussed in Sec. 3, a perturbed distribution should not only be within the
Wasserstein ball of the original image after normalization but also be elementwise within [0, 1] after
un-normalization by multiplying the original `1 norm ||x||1. This can be expressed as an additional
`∞ constraint on z: 0 ≤ z ≤ r, r = 1||w||1 , which can be simplified to zj ≤ r for j = 1, .., n since z
is already constrained to be non-negative.
The new entropy-regularized optimized problem with the new constraint is as follows:
minimize
z∈Rn+,Π∈Rn×n+
λ
2
‖w − z‖22 +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij) s.t. Π1 = x,Π
T 1 = z, 〈Π, C〉 ≤ , zj ≤ r (7)
for j = 1, ..., n. We introduce dual variables (α, β, ψ, φ) where ψ, φj ≥ 0, for j = 0, ..., n. The dual
of the problem is:
maximize
α,β∈Rn+,ψ∈R+,φ∈Rn+
g(α, β, ψ, φ), where
g(α, β, ψ, φ) =
{
− 12λ‖β + φ‖22 − ψ+ αTx+ βTw + φTw
−r∑j φj −∑ij exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj).
We leave the details of the derivation to subsection A.2. By maximizing g w.r.t individual dual
variables, we obtain the solution to the dual variables:
arg max
αi
g(α, β, ψ, φ) = log (xi)− log
∑
j
exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
 (8)
arg max
βj
g(α, β, ψ, φ) = λwj − φj −W
(
λ exp(−φj + λwj)
∑
i
exp(αi − ψCij − 1)
)
(9)
Note that Eq. 8 is identical to the one in Wong et al. (2019); Eq. 9 has an additional variable φj . Since
L is quadratic in φ with a negative coefficient, the maximization w.r.t. φ yields:
arg max
φj
g(α, β, ψ, φ) = max(0, λ(wj − r)− βj)
We also perform Newton steps following Wong et al. (2019) to find the solution to ψ iteratively. The
primal solutions to our optimal transport problem can be recovered as:
Πij = exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj), z = −λ−1(β + φ) + w. (10)
4.1 Run-time Optimization
We initialize the dual variables to the stopping condition in the previous PGD step, instead of
the general starting condition. Empirically, this allows the algorithm to converge faster, which
is especially helpful since the additional constraint require more iterations to converge. The full
description of our algorithm (1) can be found in subsection A.3.
Below we benchmark the attack run-time on MNIST test (Table 2) set using the original Sinkhorn
iteration (Wong et al., 2019), our constrained version with and without this optimization, and pairing
the optimized constrained Sinkhorn with our stronger attack, which is described in Sec. 5.
Attack Wong et al. (2019) Constrained Proj. +Optim. Our Attack+Optim.
Run-time 34 mins 78 mins 38 mins 38 mins
Avg.  0.443 0.460 0.460 0.135
Table 2: Run-time and effectiveness for different attacks on a standard MNIST model using a single
NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU. Average  is the mean Wasserstein radius needed to break the entire
MNIST test set (the lower the better). The overhead from the additional constraint is offset by our
run-time optimization. Our stronger attack does not have significant overhead.
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Figure 2: Left: Our new attack against the one in Wong et al. (2019) on MNIST (lower is better).
Given the same Wasserstein budget, we reduce the classifier accuracy significantly more. Right: the
same result on CIFAR-10.
4.2 Termination Conditions
To ensure that the perturbed image is sufficiently compliant with our Wasserstein threat model, we
incorporate both the Wasserstein and `1 norm constraints into the termination condition for Sinkhorn
iterations. Specifically, we calculate the Wasserstein radius over-budgetWover and ∆`1, the deviation
between the sum of the output distribution and 1, once the algorithm has converged or run for at least
a set number of iterations.
Wover =
∑
ij
Cij exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)−  (11)
∆`1 = abs(1−
∑
j
zj) (12)
We terminate the algorithm only when both quantities are sufficiently small. For attacks, we set the
threshold for dW−over to be 0.01×  and for ∆`1 to be 0.01. Note that for adversarial training, where
such strict compliance of the constraints might not be necessary, one can use more lenient thresholds
to speed-up the projection at the expense of strict compliance with the threat model.
5 Stronger Empirical Attacks
Now we take a look at the choice of the step function during PGD. The empirical attack proposed
in Wong et al. (2019) uses the steepest descent w.r.t. the `∞ norm as their PGD step, with a step size
tied to absolute pixel values.
Step Size The PGD step size for `p threat models is usually defined in the pixel space. On the
other hand, Wasserstein threat models manipulate the underlying distribution of images, thus, it is
more natural to define step sizes in the normalized distribution space. We find a trade-off between
effectiveness and run-time - a larger step size can result in a stronger attack up to a point but takes
longer for Sinkhorn iteration to converge. Empirically, we pick a step size of 0.06 for our experiments,
which limits the change to a single pixel to 6% of the total pixel mass and is much larger compared
to Wong et al. (2019). We quantified the effect of step size in subsection A.1, which shows that it
does not affect the effectiveness of the attack once it is sufficiently large.
Gradient Step The additive perturbation before projection during PGD is a function of the gradi-
ent Eq. 3, and Wong et al. (2019) used the steepest descent w.r.t. the `∞ norm, which is effective the
sign of the gradient. This is similar to the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) from the `p robustness literature, which is known to yield weaker attacks than the steepest
descent w.r.t. the `2 norm. Motivated by this, we replace the step function with the steepest descent
w.r.t. the `2 norm, and match the `∞ norm of our gradient step and the original gradient step for a fair
comparison. The empirical accuracy of both our attack and the original one is shown in Fig. 2.
Ablation Study We ablate the effect of increasing the step size and using the steepest descent
w.r.t. the `2 norm (Table 3). Our result shows that the improvement comes from both changes, and
significant gain comes from using a different gradient step that considers not just the sign.
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MNIST 1-Wasserstein × npixel 5 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000
Wong et al. (2019) (%) 100 100 100 100 94 91 83 71
+large α (%) 100 96 96 94 88 69 12 0
+large α + `2 descent (%) 100 90 85 68 39 8 1 1
CIFAR-10 1-Wasserstein × npixel 5 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000
Wong et al. (2019) (%) 82 82 82 82 82 81 80 77
+large α (%) 81 80 78 70 55 23 1 0
+large α + `2 descent (%) 76 68 58 35 20 9 1 0
Table 3: Ablation study on the effect of larger step size (α) and using steepest descent w.r.t. the `2
norm. The model under attack is the adversarially trained Wasserstein-robust model from (Wong
et al., 2019).
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Figure 3: Left: Adversarial training under our attack and that of Wong et al. (2019) on MNIST
(higher is better). Our defended model is more robust to our attack, while also robust to the attack
from Wong et al. (2019). Right: the same result on CIFAR-10
6 Defending against a Wasserstein Adversary
Following Wong et al. (2019), we use adversarial training to defend against our Wasserstein attack.
We train our MNIST model for 100 epochs and CIFAR-10 model for 200 epochs with a terminition
condition of Wover = 0.1 and ∆`1 = 0.1 (introduced in subsection 4.2) for efficiency. The model is
trained on perturbed inputs with  growing from 0.1 to 10 on an exponential schedule.
We report our result in Fig. 3. Our defended model is more robust against our stronger attack
compared to the previously defended model from Wong et al. (2019), while still being generally
robust against the attack in Wong et al. (2019). Note that for large , our defended model performs
worse than the previously defended model under the weaker attack. We believe this could be that
the adversarially trained model from Wong et al. (2019) overfits the weaker attack, similar to the
“catastrophic overfitting" phenomenon (Wong et al., 2020) associated with FGSM. We are not able to
close this gap by increasing model capacity.
7 Not Ready to Defend Against Common Natural Perturbations
The Wasserstein threat model is motivated by `p threat model’s failure to bound common natural
perturbations, e.g., translation, rotation, and blurring. Such perturbations, when their magnitude is
small, are barely perceptible to human, yet they incur a large change in the `p distance. One reason
behind this is the `p threat model perturbs each pixel independently, while the Wasserstein threat
model does not. We investigate empirically if a Wasserstein-robust model is more robust against
translations, rotations, and blurring. For some intuition regarding the `p and Wasserstein distance
incurred by such perturbations, please see subsection A.4.
As it turns out, we can rarely defend against such common perturbations by adversarially training
against a Wasserstein adversary, as shown in Table 4. The only effective case is when defending
against Gaussian blurs on CIFAR-10. We reflect on this result from two perspectives.
Better Defenses The Wasserstein threat model is much less studied than that of `p, and the naive
defense we use, adversarial training, does not defense against a large enough radius. Once we improve
7
Clean Translation Rotation Gaussian Blur
/ 5% 10% 20% 5◦ 10◦ 20◦ 3 5 7
MNIST Standard (%) 98.9 97.8 85.8 48.3 98.5 97.7 91.9 98.6 93.1 62.4Our Robust (%) 92.8 91.2 82.3 49.3 91.0 88.7 79.1 88.0 75.1 58.4
CIFAR-10 Standard (%) 94.8 94.5 94.5 93.6 91.6 86.6 64.1 35.1 17.8 15.4Our Robust (%) 84.4 84.0 84.0 81.7 82.8 81.3 70.6 69.5 35.1 24.7
Table 4: The top-1 classification accuracy of a standard and our Wasserstein-robust model under fixed
common perturbations. Gaussian blur is parameterized by the width of the kernel in pixels.
our ability to defend against a larger Wasserstein radius, we ought to gain robustness against the
natural perturbations we explored in this section. This motivates more future works on defending
against the Wasserstein threat model.
Constraints on the Threat Model Furthermore, we believe that perturbations exist on a spectrum
of semantic specificity. On one end, we have a narrow set of semantic perturbations such as
translations and rotations. We can defend against them effectively through data augmentation. On the
other end, we have highly expressive perturbation classes such as those bounded by a Wasserstein
ball, which are harder to defend against, but do not require knowing which perturbations are likely
to occur. Orthogonal to finding stronger defenses, we can constrain the expressiveness of our threat
model to make existing defenses more specific to the type of perturbations of interest.
For example, the common perturbations we study exhibit highly “smooth" movements with a
directional (for translations and rotations) or a radial (for Gaussian blurs) pattern. This “smoothness"
constraint is also exhibited in perturbations such as lens distortions and refraction, where one would
reasonably assume that the Wasserstein distance is more meaningful than `p due to the dependency
on neighboring pixels.
We leave the rigorous formulation of such a “smoothness" constraint to future works, and note a few
ideas and challenges in subsection A.5
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced a better-defined threat model based on Wasserstein distance for all images of the same
dimensionality. A procedure naively brought over from the `p threat model could lead to adversarial
examples that are not compliant with the Wasserstein threat model. We fixed this by proposing a
constrained version of the original Sinkhorn iteration algorithm, which projects onto the intersection
of a Wasserstein ball and an `∞ ball directly. This allowed us to safely explore attacks that come
close to the allowed Wasserstein boundary. By increasing the attack step size and using the steepest
descent w.r.t. the `2 norm of the gradient, we obtained a significantly stronger empirical Wasserstein
attack that breaks previously defended models easily. We defended against our attack with adversarial
training, and showed that our defended model was generally robust against prior attacks.
Nonetheless, our defended model remained inadequate to defend against large, real-world pertur-
bations, such as translations, rotations, and blurring. This highlighted the need to design better
defenses against the Wasserstein threat model, as current approaches did not yield a large enough
defense radius. On the other hand, we noted that these perturbations exhibited smoothness, and could
potentially be better modeled if we introduce smoothness constraints to our threat model. However,
key difficulties must be overcome before such constraints can be efficiently optimized, and we left
such explorations to future works.
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A Appendix
A.1 Attacking with larger step sizes
We show in Table 5 the effect of attacking our adversarially trained model with different step sizes.
The model under attack is the same as the one in Sec. 6, which is trained against an adversary with a
step size of 0.06. We notice the trade-off between run-time and attack effectiveness as we increase
the attack step size. Notably, increasing the step size beyond what the model was trained against does
not break the model. Empirically, Sinkhorn iterations as currently implemented run into numerical
issues with step sizes larger than 0.08. We hope future works can address this numerical stability
issue.
When attacking within a small Wasserstein radius (e.g., < 0.06), we also find it helpful to decrease
the PGD step size accordingly. Intuitively, if only less than 6% of the total pixel mass is allowed to
move by 1 pixel, a step size of 0.06 (as we have chosen for our experiments), which allows a single
pixel to move by 6% of the total pixel mass, only makes convergence slow without making the attack
more effective. We empirically set the step size to min( 2 , α), where  is the Wasserstein radius and
α is the step size.
MNIST Step Size Run-time Acc. (%)@100 200 400 800 1600
0.02 1.8 hrs 84 72 49 21 2
0.04 2.1 hrs 81 68 42 15 1
0.06 2.5 hrs 81 67 41 14 1
0.08 3.0 hrs 81 67 41 14 1
CIFAR-10 Step Size Run-time Acc. (%)@100 200 400 800 1600
0.02 3.7 hrs 52 44 44 44 44
0.04 4.6 hrs 52 43 43 43 43
0.06 4.9 hrs 52 43 43 43 43
0.08 5.0 hrs 51 42 42 42 42
Table 5: The trade-off between run-time and attack effectiveness for MNIST and CIFAR-10. The
accuracy is evaluated on our adversarially trained model (against an attack step size of 0.06) at various
Wasserstein radii multiplied by the per image pixel count npixel. Run-time is recorded on a single
NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU.
A.2 Derivation of the Lagrangian
Proof. For convenience, we multiply the objective by λ, expand the L∞ norm to individual pixels,
and solve this problem instead:
minimize
z∈Rn+,Π∈Rn×n+
λ
2
‖w − z‖22 +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij)
subject to Π1 = x
ΠT 1 = z
〈Π, C〉 ≤ 
zj ≤ r, j = 1, ..., n.
(13)
Here r is the maximal pixel value. Introducing dual variables (α, β, ψ, ~φ) where ψ, φj ≥ 0, for j=0,
..., n, the Lagrangian is
L(z,Π, α, β, ψ, ~φ)
=
λ
2
‖w − z‖22 +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij) + ψ(〈Π, C〉 − )
+
∑
j
φj(zj − r) + αT (x−Π1) + βT (z −ΠT 1).
(14)
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The KKT optimality conditions are now
∂L
∂Πij
= ψCij + (1 + log(Πij))− αi − βj = 0
∂L
∂zj
= λ(zj − wj) + βj + φj = 0
(15)
so at optimality, we must have
Πij = exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
z = −β + φ
λ
+ w
(16)
Plugging in the optimality conditions, we get
L(z∗,Π∗, α, β, ψ, φ)
=
λ
2
‖w − z‖22 +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij) + ψ(〈Π, C〉 − )
+
∑
j
φj(zj − r) + αT (x−Π1) + βT (z −ΠT 1)
=
−‖β‖22 − ‖φ‖22
2λ
− ψ+ αTx+ βTw + φTw − r
∑
j
φj
− β
Tφ
λ
−
∑
ij
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
=g(α, β, ψ, φ)
(17)
so the dual problem is to maximize g over α, β, ψ, φ ≥ 0, forj = 0, ..., n.
A.3 Changes to the Sinkhorn iteration algorithm
We further make a few changes to the Sinkhorn iterations proposed by Wong et al. (2019) to make
the algorithm more efficient. First, note that the argmax
φ∗j , β
∗
j := arg max
φj ,βj
g(α, β, ψ, φ)
can be obtained in one pass. First suppose the argmax φ∗j is nonnegative. Then by solving ∂g/∂βj =
∂g/∂φj = 0 we have the solutions
β∗j = log r − log
∑
i
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1)
φ∗j = max(λ(wj − r)− β∗j , 0)
If λ(wj − r)− βj above is negative, then φ∗j has to be 0, and therefore
β∗j = λwj −W
(
λ exp(λwj)
∑
i
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1)
)
Our final algorithm can be described in the following pseudo-code (1).
A.4 Common Real-world Perturbations under `p and Wasserstein distance
We first measure the distance change under `p and 1-Wasserstein when we apply such common
perturbations; the result is in Table 6. The raw distances are not comparable between the two metrics,
since the `2 distance is on the pixel space, while 1-Wasserstein is on the underlying distribution space.
We note that the 1-Wasserstein distance incurred by such perturbations scales roughly linearly with
the magnitude, while the `2 distance does not.
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Algorithm 1 Projected Sinkhorn iteration to project x onto the  Wasserstein ball around y. We use ·
to denote element-wise multiplication. The log and exp operators also apply element-wise.
input: x,w ∈ Rn, C ∈ Cn×n, λ ∈ R
Initialize αi, βi := log(1/n) for i = 1, . . . , n and ψ, φ := 1
u, v := exp(α), exp(β)
while α, β, ψ, φ not converged do
// updateK
Kψ := exp(−ψC − 1)
// block coordinate descent iterates
α := log(x)− log(Kψv)
u := exp(α)
β1 := λw − φ−W
(
uTKψ · λ exp(λw − φ)
)
β2 := log r − log
∑
i exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1)
φ := max(λ(w − r)− β1, 0)
β := where(φ < 0, β2, β1)
v := exp(β)
// Newton step
g := −+ uT (C ·Kψ)v
h := −uT (C · C ·Kψ)v
// ensure ψ ≥ 0
ψ := max(ψ − g/h, 0)
end while
return: w − (β + φ)/λ
Translation Rotation Gaussian Blur
5% 10% 20% 5◦ 10◦ 20◦ 3 5 7
MNIST `2 5.2 8.1 10.3 3.7 5.4 7.8 3.2 5.5 6.5
1-Wass. 1.0 2.2 4.2 0.5 0.8 1.5 0.3 1.0 1.6
CIFAR-10 `2 41.0 61.6 82.6 38.4 54.8 71.4 14.8 25.4 31.3
1-Wass. 1.0 2.0 3.7 0.8 1.6 2.8 0.8 1.6 2.2
Table 6: The change under `p or 1-Wasserstein after applying fixed common perturbations. Results
are averaged over the entire test set of either MNIST or CIFAR-10. Gaussian blur is parameterized
by the width of the kernel in pixels. The numerical values of the two distance metrics are not directly
comparable. Translation is based on the width of the image, which is 28 pixels for MNIST and 32
pixels for CIFAR-10.
A.5 Potential smoothness constraints on the threat model
We can directly constrain the total variance of the transport plan Π:
∑
~i,~j∈Π
Π~i→~j‖~j −~i‖2 −
∑
~i,~j∈Π
Π~i→~j(~j −~i)
2
Here,~i and ~j are the position of pixels. The challenge for this approach is that this total variance
constraint is not convex, and therefore cannot be easily integrated into the existing optimization
framework.
A more ad-hoc approach is to use only the low-frequency gradient information when taking a PGD
step. This can be done through applying a low-pass filter, e.g., a Gaussian filter, to the gradient
matrix. Low-frequency perturbations have been studied under the `p threat model (CITE); the
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dynamics between the perturbation frequency under the Wasserstein threat model and how close it is
to modeling natural perturbations such as translations, rotations, and blurring is an open problem.
Another potential challenge is the use of local transport plans in Wong et al. (2019) for efficiency.
This approximation can fundamentally limit the magnitude of the perturbations we can model; for
example, using a 5-by-5 local transport plan limits the translations we can model to at most 2 pixels.
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